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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 A recently enacted statute in New Jersey prohibits 
licensed counselors from engaging in “sexual orientation 
change efforts”1 with a client under the age of 18. 
Individuals and organizations that seek to provide such 
counseling filed suit in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, challenging this law as a 
violation of their First Amendment rights to free speech 
and free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs also asserted 
claims on behalf of their minor clients under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court rejected 
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims and held that they 
lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of their minor 
clients. Although we disagree with parts of the District 
Court’s analysis, we will affirm. 
                                                 
1  The term “sexual orientation change efforts” is defined 
as “the practice of seeking to change a person’s sexual 
orientation, including . . . efforts . . . to reduce or eliminate 
sexual or romantic attractions or feelings toward a person of 





Plaintiffs are individuals and organizations that 
provide licensed counseling to minor clients seeking to 
reduce or eliminate same-sex attractions (“SSA”). Dr. 
Tara King and Dr. Ronald Newman are New Jersey 
licensed counselors and founders of Christian counseling 
centers that offer counseling on a variety of issues, 
including sexual orientation change, from a religious 
perspective. The National Association for Research and 
Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”) and the 
American Association of Christian Counselors are 
organizations whose members provide similar licensed 
counseling in New Jersey. 
Plaintiffs describe sexual orientation change 
efforts (“SOCE”) counseling as “talk therapy” that is 
administered solely through verbal communication. 
SOCE counselors may begin a session by inquiring into 
potential “root causes” of homosexual behavior, such as 
childhood sexual trauma or other developmental issues, 
such as a distant relationship with the same-sex parent. A 
counselor might then attempt to effect sexual orientation 
change by discussing “traditional, gender-appropriate 
behaviors and characteristics” and how the client can 
foster and develop these behaviors and characteristics. 
Many counselors, including Plaintiffs, approach 
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counseling from a “Biblical perspective” and may also 
integrate Biblical teachings into their sessions.2  
On August 19, 2013, Governor Christopher J. 
Christie signed Assembly Bill A3371 (“A3371”) into 
law.3 A3371 provides:  
a. A person who is licensed to provide 
professional counseling . . . shall not engage 
in sexual orientation change efforts with a 
person under 18 years of age. 
b. As used in this section, “sexual 
orientation change efforts” means the 
practice of seeking to change a person’s 
sexual orientation, including, but not limited 
to, efforts to change behaviors, gender 
identity, or gender expressions, or to reduce 
or eliminate sexual or romantic attractions or 
feelings toward a person of the same gender; 
except that sexual orientation change efforts 
                                                 
2  As the District Court observed, Plaintiffs provide very 
few details of precisely what transpires during SOCE 
counseling sessions. The foregoing is the sum total of 
Plaintiffs’ descriptions, which they compiled in response to 
the District Court’s inquiries at the October 1, 2013, hearing. 
J.A. 556–57. 
3  Assembly Bill A3371 is now codified at N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 45:1-54, 55. Because the parties still refer to the law 
as A3371, we do so in this Opinion as well.  
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shall not include counseling for a person 
seeking to transition from one gender to 
another, or counseling that: 
(1) provides acceptance, support, and 
understanding of a person or 
facilitates a person’s coping, social 
support, and identity exploration and 
development, including orientation-
neutral interventions to prevent or 
address unlawful conduct or unsafe 
sexual practices; and 
 (2) does not seek to change sexual 
 orientation. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:1-55. Though A3371 does not itself 
impose any penalties, a licensed counselor who engages 
in the prohibited “sexual orientation change efforts” may 
be exposed to professional discipline by the appropriate 
licensing board. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:1-21. 
A3371 is accompanied by numerous legislative 
findings regarding the impact of SOCE counseling on 
clients seeking sexual orientation change. N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 45:1-54. The New Jersey legislature found that “being 
lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a disease, disorder, illness, 
deficiency, or shortcoming” and that “major professional 
associations of mental health practitioners and 
researchers in the United States have recognized this fact 
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for nearly 40 years.” Id. The legislature also cited reports, 
articles, resolutions, and position statements from 
reputable mental health organizations opposing 
therapeutic intervention designed to alter sexual 
orientation. Many of these sources emphasized that such 
efforts are ineffective and/or carry a significant risk of 
harm. According to the legislature, for example, a 2009 
report issued by the American Psychological Association 
(“APA Report”) concluded: 
[S]exual orientation change efforts can pose 
critical health risks to lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual people, including confusion, 
depression, guilt, helplessness, hopelessness, 
shame, social withdrawal, suicidality, 
substance abuse, stress, disappointment, 
self-blame, decreased self-esteem and 
authenticity to others, increased self-hatred, 
hostility and blame toward parents, feelings 
of anger and betrayal, loss of friends and 
potential romantic partners, problems in 
sexual and emotional intimacy, sexual 
dysfunction, high-risk sexual behaviors, a 
feeling of being dehumanized and untrue to 
self, a loss of faith, and a sense of having 
wasted time and resources.  
Id.  
Finally, the legislature declared that “New Jersey 
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has a compelling interest in protecting the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors, including lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender youth, and in protecting its 
minors against exposure to serious harms caused by 
sexual orientation change efforts.” Id. 
B. 
 On August 22, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint 
against various New Jersey executive officials (“State 
Defendants”)4 in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, alleging that A3371 violated their 
rights to free speech and free exercise of religion under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint 
also alleged constitutional claims on behalf of Plaintiffs’ 
minor clients and their parents. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
claimed that A3371 violated the minor clients’ First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech and free 
exercise of religion and the parents’ Fourteenth 
                                                 
4  These State Defendants include Christopher J. 
Christie, Governor; Eric T. Kanefsky, Director of the New 
Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety: Division of 
Consumer Affairs; Milagros Collazo, Executive Director of 
the New Jersey Board of Marriage and Family Therapy 
Examiners; J. Michael Walker, Executive Director of the 
New Jersey Board of Psychological Examiners; and Paul 
Jordan, President of the New Jersey State Board of Medical 
Examiners. Plaintiffs filed suit against each official in his or 
her official capacity.   
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Amendment right to substantive due process.5  
The following day, Plaintiffs moved for a 
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary 
Injunction to prevent enforcement of A3371. During a 
telephone conference with the parties, the District Court 
denied Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary relief and, at 
Plaintiffs’ request, converted this motion into a motion 
for summary judgment. On September 6, 2013, Garden 
State Equality (“Garden State”), a New Jersey civil rights 
organization that advocates for lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender equality, filed a motion to intervene as a 
defendant. On September 13, 2013, State Defendants and 
Garden State filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The District Court heard argument on all of these 
motions on October 1, 2013, and issued a final ruling in 
an order dated November 8, 2013.  
The District Court first considered whether Garden 
State was required to demonstrate Article III standing to 
participate in the lawsuit as an intervening party.6 The 
                                                 
5  The complaint also alleged various claims under the 
constitution of New Jersey. Plaintiffs abandoned these claims 
in the District Court.  
6  Article III standing requires (1) an injury in fact, (2) 
that is causally related to the alleged conduct of the 
defendant, and (3) that is redressable by judicial action. 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000).  
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Court acknowledged that this was an open question in the 
Third Circuit, and adopted the view held by a majority of 
our sister circuits that an intervenor need not have Article 
III standing to participate. The Court then held that 
Garden State fulfilled the requirements for permissive 
intervention pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(b), reasoning that Garden State’s motion was timely, 
it shared a common legal defense with State Defendants, 
and its participation would not unduly prejudice the 
adjudication of Plaintiffs’ rights. Accordingly, the Court 
granted Garden State’s motion to intervene.  
The District Court then considered whether 
Plaintiffs possessed standing to pursue claims on behalf 
of their minor clients and their parents. It reasoned first 
that “Plaintiffs’ ability to bring third-party claims hinges 
on whether they suffered any constitutional wrongs by 
the passage of A3371.” J.A. 24. It then held that because, 
as it would explain later in its opinion, A3371 did not 
violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Plaintiffs did not 
suffer an “injury in fact” sufficient to confer third-party 
standing. The Court also held that Plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that these third parties were sufficiently 
hindered in their ability to protect their own interests. 
Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment for 
Defendants on Plaintiffs’ third-party claims.  
The District Court then considered whether A3371 
violated Plaintiffs’ right to free speech. Relying heavily 
on the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding a similar 
 15 
 
statute in Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 
2013),7 the Court concluded that A3371 regulates 
conduct, not speech. The Court also determined that 
A3371 does not have an “incidental effect” on speech 
sufficient to trigger a lower level of scrutiny under 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Having 
determined that A3371 regulates neither speech nor 
expressive conduct, the District Court rejected Plaintiffs’ 
free speech challenge.8 The District Court also concluded 
                                                 
7  After the District Court issued its opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc in Pickup and, 
in the process, amended its opinion to include, inter alia, a 
discussion of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
1 (2010). Compare Pickup, 728 F.3d 1042 with Pickup v. 
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013) cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2871 (2014) and cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 2881 (2014). We will 
discuss Pickup and Humanitarian Law Project in more detail 
infra.  
8  After concluding that A3371 regulates neither speech 
nor expressive conduct, the District Court went on to subject 
the statute to rational basis review. In a footnote, it explained 
that it had, by this point, “rejected Plaintiff’s First 
Amendment free speech challenge,” but that it was applying 
rational basis review to determine “whether there [was] any 
substantive due process violation.” J.A. 48 n.26. This 
explanation is puzzling, however, given that Plaintiffs alleged 
a substantive due process claim only on behalf of their minor 
patients’ parents, and the District Court’s rejection of these 




that A3371 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.  
The District Court next rejected Plaintiffs’ free 
exercise claim. It was not convinced by Plaintiffs’ 
arguments that A3371 engaged in impermissible 
gerrymandering, and concluded instead that A3371 was a 
neutral law of general applicability subject only to 
rational basis review. The District Court then held that 
A3371 is rationally related to New Jersey’s legitimate 
interest in protecting its minors from harm and, 
accordingly, granted Defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment on Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim. This timely 
appeal followed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We review a district court’s legal conclusions de 
novo and ordinarily review its factual findings for clear 
error. Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. 
Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 653 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 
2011). Because this case implicates the First 
Amendment, however, we are obligated to “make an 
independent examination of the whole record” to “make 
sure that the trial court’s judgment does not constitute a 
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” Id. 




       We first turn to the issue of whether A3371, as 
applied to the SOCE counseling Plaintiffs seek to 
provide, violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to 
free speech. The District Court held that it does not, 
reasoning that SOCE counseling is “conduct” that 
receives no protection under the First Amendment. We 
disagree, and hold that the verbal communication that 
occurs during SOCE counseling is speech that enjoys 
some degree of protection under the First Amendment. 
Because Plaintiffs are speaking as state-licensed 
professionals within the confines of a professional 
relationship, however, this level of protection is 
diminished. Accordingly, A3371 survives Plaintiffs’ free 
speech challenge if it directly advances the State’s 
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from harmful 
or ineffective professional practices and is not more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. We hold 
that A3371 meets these requirements. 
A. 
With respect to Plaintiffs’ free speech challenge, 
the preliminary issue we must address is whether A3371 
has restricted Plaintiffs’ speech or, as the District Court 
held, merely regulated their conduct. The parties agree 
that modern-day SOCE therapy, and that practiced by 
Plaintiffs in this case, is “talk therapy” that is 
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administered wholly through verbal communication.9 
Though verbal communication is the quintessential form 
of “speech” as that term is commonly understood, 
Defendants argue that these particular communications 
are “conduct” and not “speech” for purposes of the First 
Amendment because they are merely the “tool” 
employed by therapists to administer treatment. Thus, the 
question we confront is whether verbal communications 
become “conduct” when they are used as a vehicle for 
mental health treatment.  
We hold that these communications are “speech” 
for purposes of the First Amendment. Defendants have 
not directed us to any authority from the Supreme Court 
or this circuit that have characterized verbal or written 
communications as “conduct” based on the function these 
communications serve. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
rejected this very proposition in Holder v. Humanitarian 
                                                 
9  Prior forms of SOCE therapy included non-verbal 
“aversion treatments, such as inducing nausea, vomiting, or 
paralysis, providing electric shocks; or having the individual 
snap an elastic band around the wrist when the individual 
became aroused to same-sex erotic images or thoughts.” J.A. 
306 (APA Report). Plaintiffs condemn these techniques as 
“unethical methods of treatment that have not been used by 
any ethical and licensed mental health professional in 
decades” and believe “professionals who engage in such 
techniques should have their licenses revoked.” J.A. 171 
(Decl. of Dr. Tara King). 
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Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). In that case, plaintiffs 
claimed that a federal statute prohibiting the provision of 
“material support” to designated terrorist organizations 
violated their free speech rights by preventing them from 
providing legal training and advice to the Partiya 
Karkeran Kurdistan (“PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”). Id. at 10–11. Defendants 
responded that the “material support” statute should not 
be subjected to strict scrutiny because it is directed 
toward conduct and not speech. Id. at 26–28.  
The Supreme Court, however, expressly rejected 
the argument that “the only thing actually at issue in [the] 
litigation [was] conduct.” Id. at 27. It concluded that 
while the material support statute ordinarily banned 
conduct, the activity it prohibited in the particular case 
before it—the provision of legal training and advice—
was speech. Id. at 28. It reached this conclusion based on 
the straightforward observation that plaintiffs’ proposed 
activity consisted of “communicating a message.” Id. In 
concluding further that this statute regulated speech on 
the basis of content, the Court’s reasoning was again 
simple and intuitive: “Plaintiffs want to speak to the PKK 
and the LTTE, and whether they may do so under § 
2339B depends on what they say.” Id. at 27. Notably, 
what the Supreme Court did not do was reclassify this 
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communication as “conduct” based on the nature or 
function of what was communicated.10  
Given that the Supreme Court had no difficulty 
characterizing legal counseling as “speech,” we see no 
reason here to reach the counter-intuitive conclusion that 
the verbal communications that occur during SOCE 
counseling are “conduct.” Defendants’ citation to 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 
(1949), does not alter our conclusion. There, members of 
the Ice and Coal Drivers and Handlers Local Union No. 
953 were enjoined under a state antitrade restraint statute 
from picketing in front of an ice company in an effort to 
convince it to discontinue ice sales to non-union buyers. 
336 U.S. at 492–494. The Supreme Court rejected the 
union workers’ free speech claim, reasoning that “it has 
never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech 
or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely 
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or 
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, 
or printed.” Id. at 502 (citations omitted). This passage, 
which is now over 60 years old, has been the subject of 
much confusion. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as 
                                                 
10  Further, a plurality of the Supreme Court in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 
(1992), acknowledged that a Pennsylvania law requiring 
physicians to provide information to patients prior to 
performing abortions regulated speech rather than merely 
“treatment” or “conduct.”  
 21 
 
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the 
Uncharted Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1314–22 
(2005) (discussing eight distinct interpretations of 
Giboney’s “course of conduct” language). Yet whatever 
may be Giboney’s meaning or scope, Humanitarian Law 
Project makes clear that verbal or written 
communications, even those that function as vehicles for 
delivering professional services, are “speech” for 
purposes of the First Amendment. 561 U.S. at 27–28. 
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the District 
Court relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s recent 
decision in Pickup. Pickup involved a constitutional 
challenge to Senate Bill 1172 (“SB 1172”), which, like 
A3371, prohibits state-licensed mental health providers 
from engaging in “sexual orientation change efforts” with 
clients under 18 years of age. 740 F.3d at 1221. As here, 
SOCE counselors argued that SB 1172 violated their 
First Amendment rights to free speech and free 
exercise.11  
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Pickup explained that 
“the First Amendment rights of professionals, such as 
doctors and mental health providers” exist on a 
“continuum.” Id. at 1227. On this “continuum,” First 
Amendment protection is greatest “where a professional 
                                                 
11  Unlike the present case, plaintiffs in Pickup included 
minor patients and their parents.  
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is engaged in a public dialogue.” Id. At the midpoint of 
this continuum, which Pickup described as speech 
“within the confines of the professional relationship,” 
First Amendment protection is “somewhat diminished.” 
Id. at 1228. At the other end of this continuum is “the 
regulation of professional conduct, where the state’s 
power is great, even though such regulation may have an 
incidental effect on speech.” Id. at 1229 (citing Lowe v. 
S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring 
in the result)) (emphasis in original). 
 
 Pickup concluded that because SB 1172 “regulates 
conduct,” it fell within this third category on the 
continuum. Id. It reasoned that “[b]ecause SB 1172 
regulates only treatment, while leaving mental health 
providers free to discuss and recommend, or recommend 
against, SOCE, . . . any effect it may have on free speech 
interests is merely incidental. Therefore, we hold that SB 
1172 is subject to only rational basis review and must be 
upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate 
state interest.” Id. at 1231 (citing Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884, 967–68 
(1992) (plurality opinion)).12 The Ninth Circuit 
                                                 
12  It is not entirely clear why, or on what authority, the 
original Pickup opinion concluded that rational basis is the 
proper standard of review for a regulation of professional 
conduct that has an incidental effect on professional speech. 
The original opinion in Pickup accompanied this conclusion 
with a quote from National Association for the Advancement 
 23 
 
concluded that “SB 1172 is rationally related to the 
legitimate government interest of protecting the well-
being of minors” and, accordingly, rejected the plaintiffs’ 
free speech claim. Id. at 1232. 
 
 The Ninth Circuit’s denial of a petition for 
rehearing en banc drew a spirited dissent from Judge 
O’Scannlain. Joined by two other Ninth Circuit judges, 
he criticized the Pickup majority for merely “labeling” 
disfavored speech as “conduct” and thereby “insulat[ing] 
[SB 1172] from First Amendment scrutiny.” 740 F.3d at 
                                                                                                             
of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of Psychology, 228 
F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000) (“NAAP”). 728 F.3d at 1056. 
The quoted passage from NAAP, however, refers to the proper 
standard for reviewing an equal protection challenge to a law 
that discriminates against a non-suspect class—it did not, in 
any way, establish that rational basis is the proper standard 
for reviewing a free speech challenge to a law that regulates 
professional conduct. See 228 F.3d at 1049. When the Ninth 
Circuit amended Pickup following the denial of the petition 
for rehearing en banc, the panel substituted the citation to 
NAAP with one to Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884, 967–68 (1992), in which, 
according to the Ninth Circuit, “a plurality of three justices, 
plus four additional justices concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, applied a reasonableness standard to the regulation of 
medicine where speech may be implicated incidentally.” 
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231. We will discuss infra the proper 
standard of review for regulation of professional speech, as 
well as the relevance of Casey to this analysis. 
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1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). Judge O’Scannlain further explained: 
The panel provides no principled doctrinal 
basis for its dichotomy: by what criteria do 
we distinguish between utterances that are 
truly “speech,” on the one hand, and those 
that are, on the other hand, somehow 
“treatment” or “conduct”? The panel, 
contrary to common sense and without legal 
authority, simply asserts that some spoken 
words—those prohibited by SB 1172—are 
not speech. 
Id. at 1215–16.  
Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent also relied heavily 
upon Humanitarian Law Project. Judge O’Scannlain 
argued that Humanitarian Law Project “flatly refused to 
countenance the government’s purported distinction 
between ‘conduct’ and ‘speech’ for constitutional 
purposes when the activity at issue consisted of talking 
and writing.” Id. at 1216. He explained that 
Humanitarian Law Project stood for the proposition that 
“the government’s ipse dixit cannot transform ‘speech’ 
into ‘conduct’ that it may more freely regulate.” Id.13  
                                                 
13  The amended Pickup opinion acknowledges that 
Humanitarian Law Project found activity to be “speech” 
when it “consist[ed] of communicating a message,” but 
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While Pickup acknowledged that SB 1172 may 
have at least an “incidental effect” on speech and 
subjected the statute to rational basis review,14 here the 
District Court went one step further when it concluded 
that SOCE counseling is pure, non-expressive conduct 
that falls wholly outside the protection of the First 
Amendment. The District Court’s primary rationale for 
                                                                                                             
contends that “SB 1172 does not prohibit Plaintiffs from 
‘communicating a message’” because “[i]t is a state 
regulation governing the conduct of state-licensed 
professionals, and it does not pertain to communication in the 
public sphere.” Id. at 1230 (quoting Humanitarian Law 
Project, 561 U.S. at 28) (emphasis added by Pickup). We are 
not persuaded. Humanitarian Law Project concluded that the 
“material support” statute regulated speech despite explicitly 
acknowledging that it did not stifle communication in the 
public sphere. 561 U.S. at 25–26 (“Under the material-
support statute, plaintiffs may say anything they wish on any 
topic. They may speak and write freely about the PKK and 
LTTE, the governments of Turkey and Sri Lanka, human 
rights, and international law. They may advocate before the 
United Nations.”).  
14  Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent in Pickup accuses the 
majority of “entirely exempt[ing] [SB 1172] from the First 
Amendment.” 740 F.3d at 1215 (O’Scannlain, dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). We do not believe the 
Ninth Circuit went that far. As we have explained, the Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged that SB 1172 “may” have an 
“incidental effect” on speech, and thus applied rational basis 
review; it did not exempt SB 1172 from any review at all.  
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this conclusion was that “the core characteristic of 
counseling is not that it may be carried out through 
talking, but rather that the counselor applies methods and 
procedures in a therapeutic manner.” J.A. 35 (emphasis 
added). The District Court derived this reasoning in part 
from Pickup, in which the Ninth Circuit observed that the 
“key component of psychoanalysis is the treatment of 
emotional suffering and depression, not speech.” 740 
F.3d at 1226 (quoting National Association for the 
Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. California Board of 
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000)). On 
this basis, the District Court concluded that “the line of 
demarcation between conduct and speech is whether the 
counselor is attempting to communicate information or a 
particular viewpoint to the client or whether the 
counselor is attempting to apply methods, practices, and 
procedures to bring about a change in the client—the 
former is speech and the latter is conduct.” J.A. 39.  
 
As we have explained, the argument that verbal 
communications become “conduct” when they are used 
to deliver professional services was rejected by 
Humanitarian Law Project. Further, the enterprise of 
labeling certain verbal or written communications 
“speech” and others “conduct” is unprincipled and 
susceptible to manipulation. Notably, the Pickup 
majority, in the course of establishing a “continuum” of 
protection for professional speech, never explained 
exactly how a court was to determine whether a statute 
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regulated “speech” or “conduct.” See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 
1215–16 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“[B]y what criteria do we distinguish 
between utterances that are truly ‘speech,’ on the one 
hand, and those that are, on the other hand, somehow 
‘treatment’ or ‘conduct’?”). And the District Court’s 
analysis fares no better; even a cursory inspection of the 
line it establishes between utterances that “communicate 
information or a particular viewpoint” and those that seek 
“to apply methods, practices, and procedures” reveals the 
illusory nature of such a dichotomy. 
 
For instance, consider a sophomore psychology 
major who tells a fellow student that he can reduce same-
sex attractions by avoiding effeminate behaviors and 
developing a closer relationship with his father. Surely 
this advice is not “conduct” merely because it seeks to 
apply “principles” the sophomore recently learned in a 
behavioral psychology course. Yet it would be strange 
indeed to conclude that the same words, spoken with the 
same intent, somehow become “conduct” when the 
speaker is a licensed counselor. That the counselor is 
speaking as a licensed professional may affect the level 
of First Amendment protection her speech enjoys, but 
this fact does not transmogrify her words into “conduct.” 
As another example, a law student who tries to convince 
her friend to change his political orientation is assuredly 
“speaking” for purposes of the First Amendment, even if 
she uses particular rhetorical “methods” in the process. 
 28 
 
To classify some communications as “speech” and others 
as “conduct” is to engage in nothing more than a 
“labeling game.” Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1218 (O’Scannlain, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
Lastly, the District Court’s classification of 
counseling as “conduct” was largely motivated by its 
reluctance to imbue certain professions—i.e., clinical 
psychology and psychiatry—with “special First 
Amendment protection merely because they use the 
spoken word as therapy.” J.A. 38. According to the 
District Court, the “fundamental problem” with 
characterizing SOCE counseling as “speech” is that “it 
would mean that any regulation of professional 
counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First 
Amendment speech rights.” Id. at 39. This result, 
reasoned the District Court, would “run[] counter to the 
longstanding principle that a state generally may enact 
laws rationally regulating professionals, including those 
providing medicine and mental health services.” Id. 
(citations omitted).  
As we will explain, the District Court’s concern is 
not without merit, but it speaks to whether SOCE 
counseling falls within a lesser protected or unprotected 
category of speech—not whether these verbal 
communications are somehow “conduct.” Simply put, 
speech is speech, and it must be analyzed as such for 
purposes of the First Amendment. Certain categories of 
speech receive lesser protection, see, e.g., Ohralik v. 
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Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978), or 
even no protection at all, see, e.g., Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). But these categories are deeply 
rooted in history, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
cautioned against exercising “freewheeling authority to 
declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the 
First Amendment.” United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 
2537 (2012) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460, 472 (2010)). By labeling certain communications as 
“conduct,” thereby assuring that they receive no First 
Amendment protection at all, the District Court has 
effectively done just that.  
Thus, we conclude that the verbal communications 
that occur during SOCE counseling are not “conduct,” 
but rather “speech” for purposes of the First Amendment. 
We now turn to the issue of whether such speech falls 
within a historically delineated category of lesser 
protected or unprotected expression.  
B. 
The District Court’s focus on whether SOCE 
counseling is “speech” or “conduct” obscured the 
important constitutional inquiry at the heart of this case: 
the level of First Amendment protection afforded to 
speech that occurs as part of the practice of a licensed 
profession. In addressing this question, we first turn to 
whether such speech is fully protected by the First 
Amendment. We conclude that it is not.  
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The authority of the States to regulate the practice 
of certain professions is deeply rooted in our nation’s 
jurisprudence. Over 100 years ago, the Supreme Court 
deemed it “too well settled to require discussion” that 
“the police power of the states extends to the regulation 
of certain trades and callings, particularly those which 
closely concern the public health.” Watson v. State of 
Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910). See also Dent v. 
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (“[I]t has been 
the practice of different states, from time immemorial, to 
exact in many pursuits a certain degree of skill and 
learning upon which the community may confidently 
rely.”). The Court has recognized that States have “broad 
power to establish standards for licensing practitioners 
and regulating the practice of professions.” Goldfarb v. 
Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). See also 
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460 (“[T]he State bears a special 
responsibility for maintaining standards among members 
of the licensed professions.”). The exercise of this 
authority is necessary to “shield[] the public against the 
untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible.” 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
When a professional regulation restricts what a 
professional can and cannot say, however, it creates a 
“collision between the power of government to license 
and regulate those who would pursue a profession or 
vocation and the rights of freedom of speech and of the 
 31 
 
press guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Lowe v. 
S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring 
in the result). Justice Jackson first explored this area of 
“two well-established, but at times overlapping, 
constitutional principles” in Thomas 323 U.S. at 544–48 
(1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). There, he explained: 
A state may forbid one without its license to 
practice law as a vocation, but I think it 
could not stop an unlicensed person from 
making a speech about the rights of man or 
the rights of labor . . . . Likewise, the state 
may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an 
occupation without its license but I do not 
think it could make it a crime publicly or 
privately to speak urging persons to follow 
or reject any school of medical thought. So 
the state to an extent not necessary now to 
determine may regulate one who makes a 
business or a livelihood of soliciting funds 
or memberships for unions. But I do not 
think it can prohibit one, even if he is a 
salaried labor leader, from making an 
address to a public meeting of workmen, 
telling them their rights as he sees them and 
urging them to unite in general or to join a 
specific union. 
Id. at 544–45. Ultimately, Justice Jackson concluded that 
the speech at issue—which encouraged a large group of 
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Texas workers to join a specific labor union—“f[ell] in 
the category of a public speech, rather than that of 
practicing a vocation as solicitor” and was therefore fully 
protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 548. 
 Justice White expounded upon Justice Jackson’s 
analysis in Lowe. He and two other justices agreed that 
“[t]he power of government to regulate the professions is 
not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails 
speech” but also recognized that “[a]t some point, a 
measure is no longer a regulation of a profession but a 
regulation of speech or of the press.” 472 U.S. at 228, 
230 (White, J., concurring in the result). Building on 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence, Justice White defined the 
contours of First Amendment protection in the realm of 
professional speech: 
One who takes the affairs of a client 
personally in hand and purports to exercise 
judgment on behalf of the client in the light 
of the client’s individual needs and 
circumstances is properly viewed as 
engaging in the practice of a profession. Just 
as offer and acceptance are communications 
incidental to the regulable transaction called 
a contract, the professional’s speech is 
incidental to the conduct of the profession. . 
. . Where the personal nexus between 
professional and client does not exist, and a 
speaker does not purport to be exercising 
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judgment on behalf of any particular 
individual with whose circumstances he is 
directly acquainted, government regulation 
ceases to function as legitimate regulation of 
professional practice with only incidental 
impact on speech; it becomes regulation of 
speaking or publishing as such, subject to 
the First Amendment’s command that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 
 
Id. at 232.  
 The Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
professional speech most recently in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). Though the bulk of the plurality’s 
opinion was devoted to a substantive due process claim, 
it addressed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim briefly 
in the following paragraph:  
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an 
asserted First Amendment right of a 
physician not to provide information about 
the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a 
manner mandated by the State. To be sure, 
the physician’s First Amendment rights not 
to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), but only as 
part of the practice of medicine, subject to 
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reasonable licensing and regulation by the 
State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 
(1977). We see no constitutional infirmity in 
the requirement that the physician provide 
the information mandated by the State here. 
Id. at 884. 
A trio of recent federal appellate decisions has read 
these opinions to establish special rules for the regulation 
of speech that occurs pursuant to the practice of a 
licensed profession. See Wollschlaeger v. Florida, No. 
12-cv-14009, 2014 WL 3695296, at *13–21 (11th Cir. 
July 25, 2014); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–29; Moore-
King v. County of Chesterfield, Va., 708 F.3d 560, 568–
70 (4th Cir. 2013). In Moore-King, for example, the 
Fourth Circuit drew heavily from the concurrences in 
Thomas and Lowe in holding that “professional speech” 
does not receive full protection under the First 
Amendment. 708 F.3d at 568–70. Consistent with Justice 
White’s concurrence in Lowe, Moore-King explained that 
“the relevant inquiry to determine whether to apply the 
professional speech doctrine is whether the speaker is 
providing personalized advice in a private setting to a 
paying client or instead engages in public discussion and 
commentary.” Id. at 569. It then concluded that plaintiff’s 
speech, which consisted of “spiritual counseling” that 
involved “a personalized reading for a paying client,” 
was “professional speech” which the state could regulate 
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without triggering strict scrutiny under the First 
Amendment. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit also embraced the idea of 
professional speech in Pickup. Although the District 
Court focused primarily on Pickup’s discussion of 
whether SOCE counseling is “speech” or “conduct,” the 
Ninth Circuit also relied heavily on the constitutional 
principle that a licensed professional’s speech is not 
afforded the full scope of First Amendment protection 
when it occurs as part of the practice of a profession. See 
740 F.3d at 1227–29. In recognizing a “continuum” of 
First Amendment protection for licensed professionals, 
Pickup relied heavily on Justice White’s concurrence in 
Lowe and the plurality opinion in Casey. Id. As discussed 
supra, Pickup held that First Amendment protection is 
“at its greatest” when a professional is “engaged in a 
public dialogue,” id. at 1227 (citing Lowe, 472 U.S. at 
232 (White, J., concurring in the result)); “somewhat 
diminished” when the professional is speaking “within 
the confines of a professional relationship,” id. at 1228 
(citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion)); and at 
its lowest when “the regulation [is] of professional 
conduct . . . even though such regulation may have an 
incidental effect on speech,” id. at 1229 (citing Lowe, 
472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring in the result)).  
Most recently, the Eleventh Circuit also 
recognized that professional speech is not fully protected 
under the First Amendment. Wollschlaeger, 2014 WL 
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3695296. While the Eleventh Circuit would afford 
“speech to the public by attorneys on public issues” with 
“the strongest protection our Constitution has to offer,” it 
held that the full scope of First Amendment protection 
did not apply to a physician speaking “only as part of the 
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and 
regulation by the State.” Id. at *14 (quoting Casey, 505 
U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion)). Similar to Moore-King, 
Wollschlaeger explained that “the key to distinguishing 
between occupational regulation and abridgment of First 
Amendment liberties is in finding a personal nexus 
between professional and client.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  
We find the reasoning in these cases to be 
informative. Licensed professionals, through their 
education and training, have access to a corpus of 
specialized knowledge that their clients usually do not. 
Indeed, the value of the professional’s services stems 
largely from her ability to apply this specialized 
knowledge to a client’s individual circumstances. Thus, 
clients ordinarily have no choice but to place their trust in 
these professionals, and, by extension, in the State that 
licenses them. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
768 (1976) (“[H]igh professional standards, to a 
substantial extent, are guaranteed by the close regulation 
to which pharmacists in Virginia are subject.”). It is the 
State’s imprimatur and the regulatory oversight that 
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accompanies it that provide clients with the confidence 
they require to put their health or their livelihood in the 
hands of those who utilize knowledge and methods with 
which the clients ordinarily have little or no familiarity.  
This regulatory authority is particularly important 
when applied to professions related to mental and 
physical health. See Watson, 218 U.S. at 176 (“[T]he 
police power of the states extends to the regulation of 
certain trades and callings, particularly those which 
closely concern the public health.”). The practice of most 
professions, mental health professions in particular, will 
inevitably involve communication between the 
professional and her client—this is, of course, how 
professionals and clients interact. To handcuff the State’s 
ability to regulate a profession whenever speech is 
involved would therefore unduly undermine its authority 
to protect its citizens from harm. See Robert Post, 
Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment 
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 939, 950 (2007) (“The practice of medicine, like all 
human behavior, transpires through the medium of 
speech. In regulating the practice, therefore, the state 
must necessarily also regulate professional speech.”).  
Thus, we conclude that a licensed professional 
does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment 
when speaking as part of the practice of her profession. 
Like the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, we believe a 
professional’s speech warrants lesser protection only 
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when it is used to provide personalized services to a 
client based on the professional’s expert knowledge and 
judgment. See Wollschlaeger, 2014 WL 3695296, at *14; 
Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569. By contrast, when a 
professional is speaking to the public at large or offering 
her personal opinion to a client, her speech remains 
entitled to the full scope of protection afforded by the 
First Amendment.15 
                                                 
15  While we embrace Pickup’s conclusion that First 
Amendment protection differs in the context of professional 
speech, we decline to adopt its three categories of protection. 
It is indisputable that a professional “engaged in a public 
dialogue” receives robust protection under the First 
Amendment. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227. But we find that the 
other two points on Pickup’s “continuum” are usually 
conflated; a regulation of “professional conduct” will in many 
cases “incidentally” affect speech that occurs “within the 
confines of a professional relationship.” Id. at 1228–29. 
SB1172 is a prime example: even if, as the Pickup panel 
reasoned, it only “incidentally” affects speech, the speech that 
it incidentally affects surely occurs within the confines of the 
counseling relationship. In fact, Pickup itself conflated these 
two categories when applying its “continuum” to SB1172. 
Though it held that SB1172 implicated the least protected 
category, Pickup subjected the statute to the level of scrutiny 
of its midpoint category—i.e., Casey’s rational basis test. See 
id. at 1228–29. Thus, we refuse to adopt Pickup’s distinction 
between speech that occurs within the confines of a 
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With these principles in mind, it is clear to us that 
speech occurring as part of SOCE counseling is 
professional speech. SOCE counselors provide 
specialized services to individual clients in the form of 
psychological practices and procedures designed to effect 
a change in the clients’ thought patterns and behaviors. 
Importantly, A3371 does not prevent these counselors 
from engaging in a public dialogue on homosexuality or 
sexual orientation change—it prohibits only a 
professional practice that is, in this instance, carried out 
through verbal communication. While the function of this 
speech does not render it “conduct” that is wholly outside 
the scope of the First Amendment, it does place it within 
a recognized category of speech that is not entitled to the 
full protection of the First Amendment.  
C. 
That we have classified Plaintiffs’ speech as 
professional speech does not end our inquiry. While the 
cases above make clear that such speech is not fully 
protected under the First Amendment, the question 
remains whether this category receives some lesser 
degree of protection or no protection at all. We hold that 
professional speech receives diminished protection, and, 
accordingly, that prohibitions of professional speech are 
constitutional only if they directly advance the State’s 
                                                                                                             
professional relationship and that which is only incidentally 
affected by a regulation of professional conduct. 
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interest in protecting its citizens from harmful or 
ineffective professional practices and are no more 
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 
In explaining why this level of protection is 
appropriate, we find it helpful to compare professional 
speech to commercial speech. For over 35 years, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that commercial speech—
truthful, non-misleading speech that proposes a legal 
economic transaction—enjoys diminished protection 
under the First Amendment. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 
454–59.16 Though such speech was at one time 
considered outside the scope of the First Amendment 
altogether, see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 
(1942), the Supreme Court reversed course in Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818–26 (1975), and recognized 
that commercial speech enjoys some degree of 
protection. The Court has since explained that 
commercial speech has value under the First Amendment 
because it facilitates the “free flow of commercial 
information,” in which both the intended recipients and 
society at large have a strong interest. Virginia State Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976) (“Virginia 
                                                 
16  Advertisements that are false or misleading have never 
been recognized as protected by the First Amendment. See 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). Nor have 
advertisements proposing illegal transactions. See id. at 772.  
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Pharmacy”); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Public Serv. Comm. of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561–
62 (1980) (explaining that commercial speech “assists 
consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest 
possible dissemination of information”). In fact, the 
Court has recognized that a consumer’s interest in this 
information “may be as keen, if not keener by far, than 
his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.” 
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.  
Despite recognizing the value of commercial 
speech, the Court has “not discarded the ‘common-sense’ 
distinction” between commercial speech and other areas 
of protected expression. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56 
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24). 
Instead, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
commercial speech enjoys only diminished protection 
because it “occurs in an area traditionally subject to 
government regulation.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56). Because 
commercial speech is “linked inextricably with the 
commercial arrangement it proposes, . . . the State’s 
interest in regulating the underlying transaction may give 
it a concomitant interest in the expression itself.” 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.761, 767 (1993) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, a 
prohibition of commercial speech is permissible when it 
“directly advances” a “substantial” government interest 
and is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
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interest.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Supreme 
Court later dubbed this standard of review “intermediate 
scrutiny.” Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 
623–24 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  
 We believe that commercial and professional 
speech share important qualities and, thus, that 
intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of 
review for prohibitions aimed at either category. Like 
commercial speech, professional speech is valuable to 
listeners and, by extension, to society as a whole because 
of the “informational function” it serves. Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. As previously discussed, 
professionals have access to a body of specialized 
knowledge to which laypersons have little or no 
exposure. Although this information may reach non-
professionals through other means, such as journal 
articles or public speeches, it will often be communicated 
to them directly by a licensed professional during the 
course of a professional relationship. Thus, professional 
speech, like commercial speech, serves as an important 
channel for the communication of information that might 
otherwise never reach the public. See Post, supra, at 977; 
see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62 (describing 
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“the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination 
of information”).17   
 Additionally, like commercial speech, professional 
speech also “occurs in an area traditionally subject to 
government regulation.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
562 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56). As we have 
previously explained, States have traditionally enjoyed 
broad authority to regulate professions as a means of 
protecting the public from harmful or ineffective 
professional services. Accordingly, as with commercial 
speech, it is difficult to ignore the “common-sense” 
differences between professional speech and other forms 
of protected communication. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56 
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24).  
Given these striking similarities, we conclude that 
professional speech should receive the same level of First 
Amendment protection as that afforded commercial 
speech. Thus, we hold that a prohibition of professional 
                                                 
17  We also recognize that professional speech can often 
serve an expressive function insofar as a professional’s 
personal beliefs—including deeply-held political or religious 
beliefs—are infused in the practice of a profession. SOCE 
counselors, for example, provide counseling not merely for 
remuneration but as a means of putting important beliefs and 
values into practice. This expressive value is further reason to 
afford professional speech some level of protection under the 
First Amendment.  
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speech is permissible only if it “directly advances” the 
State’s “substantial” interest in protecting clients from 
ineffective or harmful professional services, and is “not 
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.” 
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  
In so holding, we emphasize that a regulation of 
professional speech is spared from more demanding 
scrutiny only when the regulation was, as here, enacted 
pursuant to the State’s interest in protecting its citizens 
from ineffective or harmful professional services. 
Because the State’s regulatory authority over licensed 
professionals stems from its duty to protect the clients of 
these professionals, a state law may be subject to strict 
scrutiny if designed to advance an interest unrelated to 
client protection. Thus, a law designed to combat 
terrorism is not a professional regulation, and, 
accordingly, may be subject to strict scrutiny. See 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 25–28. Similarly, 
a law that is not intended to protect a professional’s 
clients, but to insulate certain laws from constitutional 
challenge, is more than just a regulation of professional 
speech and, accordingly, intermediate scrutiny is not the 
proper standard of review. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 540–49 (2001).18 
                                                 
18  Like Humanitarian Law Project, Velazquez concerned 
federal legislation which could not have been passed pursuant 
to the State’s police power. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536. 
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We recognize that our sister circuits have 
concluded that regulations of professional speech are 
subject to a more deferential standard of review or, 
possibly, no review at all. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231; 
Wollschlaeger, 2014 WL 3695296, at *13–14; Moore-
King, 708 F.3d at 567–70. Pickup, for example, cited 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 884, 967–68 (plurality opinion), as 
support for its decision to apply rational basis review to a 
similar statute. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231.19 
                                                 
19  Pickup is the only court to explicitly apply rational 
basis review to a regulation of professional speech. 740 F.3d 
at 1231. Wollschlaeger and Moore-King, by contrast, do not 
explicitly identify the level of scrutiny they apply, if they 
apply one at all. In Wollschlaeger, the majority held that “a 
statute that governs the practice of an occupation is not 
unconstitutional as an abridgment of the right to free speech, 
so long as any inhibition of that right is merely the incidental 
effect of observing an otherwise legitimate regulation.” 2014 
WL 3695296, at *13 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also id. at *15 (noting that generally applicable 
licensing regimes “do[] not implicate constitutionally 
protected activity under the First Amendment”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). But see id. at *41 
(Wilson, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority opinion to 
apply rational basis review). Similarly, in Moore-King, the 
majority held that “[u]nder the professional speech doctrine, 
the government can license and regulate those who would 
provide services to their clients for compensation without 
running afoul of the First Amendment.” 708 F.3d at 569. But 
 46 
 
To the extent Casey suggested rational basis 
review, we do not believe such a standard governs here. 
While the plurality opinion noted in passing that speech, 
when part of the practice of medicine, is “subject to 
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State,” 505 
U.S. at 884 (emphasis added), the regulation it addressed 
fell within a special category of laws that compel 
disclosure of truthful factual information, id. at 881. In 
the context of commercial speech, the Supreme Court has 
treated compelled disclosures of truthful factual 
information differently than prohibitions of speech, 
subjecting the former to rational basis review and the 
latter to intermediate scrutiny. See Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985) (outlining the “material 
differences between disclosure requirements and outright 
prohibitions on speech” and subjecting a disclosure 
requirement to rational basis review). Thus, to the extent 
Casey applied rational basis review, this facet of the 
opinion is inapplicable to the present case because the 
law at issue is a prohibition of speech, not a compulsion 
of truthful factual information. See Wollschlaeger, 2014 
WL 3695296, at *38 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (reasoning 
that “[e]ven if Casey applied something less than 
                                                                                                             
see id. at 570 (refusing to “afford the government carte 
blanche in crafting or implementing [occupational] 
regulations” and refraining from “delineat[ing] the precise 
boundaries of permissible occupational regulation under the 
professional speech doctrine”). 
 47 
 
intermediate scrutiny,” Zauderer establishes that a more 
stringent standard of review should apply to restrictions 
on professional speech.).  
Additionally, we have serious doubts that anything 
less than intermediate scrutiny would adequately protect 
the First Amendment interests inherent in professional 
speech. Without sufficient judicial oversight, legislatures 
could too easily suppress disfavored ideas under the 
guise of professional regulation. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 
1215 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). This possibility is particularly 
disturbing when the suppressed ideas concern specialized 
knowledge that is unlikely to reach the general public 
through channels other than the professional-client 
relationship. Intermediate scrutiny is necessary to ensure 
that State legislatures are regulating professional speech 
to prohibit the provision of harmful or ineffective 
professional services, not to inhibit politically-disfavored 
messages. 
Lastly, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument that A3371 
should be subject to strict scrutiny because it 
discriminates on the basis of content and viewpoint. First, 
although we agree with Plaintiffs that A3371 
discriminates on the basis of content,20 it does so in a way 
                                                 
20  We have little doubt in this conclusion. A3371, on its 
face, prohibits licensed counselors from speaking words with 
a particular content; i.e. words that “seek[] to change a 
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that does not trigger strict scrutiny. Ordinarily, content-
based regulations are highly disfavored and subjected to 
strict scrutiny. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2653, 2664 (2011). And this is generally true even when 
the law in question regulates unprotected or lesser 
protected speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 381–86 (1992). Nonetheless, within these 
unprotected or lesser protected categories of speech, the 
Supreme Court has held that a statute does not trigger 
strict scrutiny “[w]hen the basis for the content 
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the 
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.” Id. at 388. 
By way of illustration, the Court explained: 
[A] State may choose to regulate price 
advertising in one industry but not in others, 
because the risk of fraud (one of the 
characteristics of commercial speech that 
justifies depriving it of full First 
Amendment protection) is in its view greater 
there. But a State may not prohibit only that 
commercial advertising that depicts men in a 
demeaning fashion.  
Id. at 388–89 (internal citations omitted). 
                                                                                                             
person’s sexual orientation.” N.J. Stat Ann. § 45:1-55. Thus, 
as in Humanitarian Law Project, “Plaintiffs want to speak to 
[minor clients], and whether they may do so under [A3371] 
depends on what they say.” 561 U.S. at 27. 
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A3371 fits comfortably within this category of 
permissible content discrimination. As with the content-
based regulations identified by R.A.V. as permissible, 
“the basis for [A3371’s] content discrimination consists 
entirely of the very reason” professional speech is a 
category of lesser-protected speech. Id. at 388. The New 
Jersey legislature has targeted SOCE counseling for 
prohibition because it was presented with evidence that 
this particular form of counseling is ineffective and 
potentially harmful to clients. Thus, the reason 
professional speech receives diminished protection under 
the First Amendment—i.e., because of the State’s 
longstanding authority to protect its citizens from 
ineffective or harmful professional practices—is 
precisely the reason New Jersey targeted SOCE 
counseling with A3371. Therefore, we conclude that 
A3371 does not trigger strict scrutiny by discriminating 
on the basis of content in an impermissible manner. 
Nor do we agree that A3371 triggers strict scrutiny 
because it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint. 
Plaintiffs argue that A3371 prohibits them from 
expressing the viewpoint “that [same sex attractions] can 
be reduced or eliminated to the benefit of the client.” 
Appellant’s Br. 26. That is a misreading of the statute. 
A3371 allows Plaintiffs to express this viewpoint, in the 
form of their personal opinion, to anyone they please, 
including their minor clients. What A3371 prevents 
Plaintiffs from doing is expressing this viewpoint in a 
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very specific way—by actually rendering the 
professional services that they believe to be effective and 
beneficial. Arguably, any time a professional engages in 
a particular professional practice she is implicitly 
communicating the viewpoint that such practice is 
effective and beneficial. The prohibition of this method 
of communicating a particular viewpoint, however, is not 
the type of viewpoint discrimination with which the First 
Amendment is concerned. If it were, State legislatures 
could never ban a particular professional practice without 
triggering strict scrutiny. Thus, a statute banning licensed 
psychotherapists from administering treatments based on 
phrenology would be subject to strict scrutiny because it 
prevents these therapists from expressing their belief in 
phrenology by putting it into practice. Such a rule would 
unduly undermine the State’s authority to regulate the 
practice of licensed professions.  
Accordingly, we believe intermediate scrutiny is 
the applicable standard of review in this case. We must 
uphold A3371 if it “directly advances” the government’s 
interest in protecting clients from ineffective and/or 
harmful professional services, and is “not more extensive 
than necessary to serve that interest.” See Central 





Our analysis begins with an evaluation of New 
Jersey’s interest in the passage of A3371. As we have 
previously explained, the State’s interest in protecting its 
citizens from harmful professional practices is 
unquestionably substantial. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 
792; Watson, 218 U.S. at 176. Here, New Jersey’s stated 
interest is even stronger because A3371 seeks to protect 
minor clients—a population that is especially vulnerable 
to such practices. See Supplemental App. 85 (Declaration 
of Douglas C. Haldeman, Ph.D.) (explaining that 
adolescent and teenage clients are “much more 
vulnerable to the potentially traumatic effects of SOCE” 
because their “pre-frontal cort[ices] [are] still developing 
and changing rapidly”).  
Our next task, then, is to determine whether A3371 
directly advances this interest by prohibiting a 
professional practice that poses serious health risks to 
minors. To survive heightened scrutiny, the State must 
establish that the harms it believes SOCE counseling 
presents are “real, not merely conjectural, and that the 
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct 
and material way.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 
512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“Turner I”) 
(citations omitted). See also Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 
F.3d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that legislatures 
cannot meet this burden by relying on “mere speculation 
or conjecture”) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 
770–71 (1992)). Even when applying intermediate 
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scrutiny, however, we do not review a legislature’s 
empirical judgment de novo—our task is merely to 
determine whether the legislature has “drawn reasonable 
inferences based on substantial evidence.” Turner Broad. 
Sys., Inc., v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (“Turner 
II”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Further, “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to 
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative 
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and 
plausibility of the justification raised.” Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).  
We conclude that New Jersey has satisfied this 
burden. The legislative record demonstrates that over the 
last few decades a number of well-known, reputable 
professional and scientific organizations have publicly 
condemned the practice of SOCE, expressing serious 
concerns about its potential to inflict harm. Among 
others, the American Psychological Association, the 
American Psychiatric Association, and the Pan American 
Health Organization have warned of the “great” or 
“serious” health risks accompanying SOCE counseling, 
including depression, anxiety, self-destructive behavior, 
and suicidality. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:1-54 (collecting 
additional position statements and articles from the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, and the American Academy 
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry warning of the health 
risks posed by SOCE counseling). Many such 
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organizations have also concluded that there is no 
credible evidence that SOCE counseling is effective. See 
id.  
We conclude that this evidence is substantial. 
Legislatures are entitled to rely on the empirical 
judgments of independent professional organizations that 
possess specialized knowledge and experience 
concerning the professional practice under review, 
particularly when this community has spoken with such 
urgency and solidarity on the subject. Such evidence is a 
far cry from the “mere speculation or conjecture” our 
cases have held to be insufficient. Pitt News, 379 F.3d at 
107 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Plaintiffs do not dispute the views of the 
professional community at large concerning the efficacy 
and potential harmfulness of SOCE counseling. Instead, 
they fault the legislature for passing A3371 without first 
obtaining conclusive empirical evidence regarding the 
effect of SOCE counseling on minors. To be sure, the 
APA Report suggests that the bulk of empirical evidence 
regarding the efficacy or harmfulness of SOCE 
counseling currently falls short of the demanding 
standards imposed by the scientific community. See J.A. 
327 (noting the “limited amount of methodologically 
sound research” on SOCE counseling); id. at 367 (noting 
that “[t]he few early research investigations that were 
conducted with scientific rigor raise concerns about the 
safety of SOCE” but refusing “to make a definitive 
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statement about whether recent SOCE is safe or harmful 
and for whom” due to a lack of “scientifically rigorous 
studies” of these practices).21 
Yet a state legislature is not constitutionally 
required to wait for conclusive scientific evidence before 
acting to protect its citizens from serious threats of harm. 
See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 
803, 822 (2000) (“This is not to suggest that a 10,000-
page record must be compiled in every case or that the 
Government must delay in acting to address a real 
problem; but the Government must present more than 
anecdote and suspicion.”). This is particularly true when 
a legislature’s empirical judgment is highly plausible, as 
we conclude New Jersey’s judgment is in this case. See 
Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391. It is not too far a leap in logic to 
conclude that a minor client might suffer psychological 
harm if repeatedly told by an authority figure that her 
sexual orientation—a fundamental aspect of her 
identity—is an undesirable condition. Further, if SOCE 
counseling is ineffective—which, as we have explained, 
is supported by substantial evidence—it would not be 
unreasonable for a legislative body to conclude that a 
minor would blame herself if her counselor’s efforts 
                                                 
21  It is worth noting that although the APA Report was 
uncomfortable making a “definitive” statement about the 
effects of SOCE, it did ultimately observe that there was at 
least “some evidence to indicate that individuals experienced 
harm from SOCE.” J.A. 287, 367.  
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failed. Given the substantial evidence with which New 
Jersey was presented, we cannot say that these fears are 
unreasonable. We therefore conclude that A3371 
“directly advances” New Jersey’s stated interest in 
protecting minor citizens from harmful professional 
practices. 
Lastly, we must determine whether A3371 is more 
extensive than necessary to protect this interest. To 
survive this prong of intermediate scrutiny, New Jersey 
“is not required to employ the least restrictive means 
conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of 
the challenged regulation to the asserted interest.” 
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 
527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) (citing Board of Tr. of State 
Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).22 
Thus, New Jersey must establish “a fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not 
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose 
scope is in proportion to the interest served.” Id. (quoting 
Fox, 492 U.S. at 480); see also Heffner v. Murphy, 745 
F.3d 56, 92–93 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding regulation of 
commercial speech while acknowledging that the fit 
between the statute and its interests was “imperfect”). 
                                                 
22  As explained in Fox, the word “necessary,” in the 
context of intermediate scrutiny, does not “translate into [a] 
‘least-restrictive-means’ test” but instead has a “more flexible 
meaning.” 492 U.S. at 476–77. 
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 Plaintiffs argue that A3371’s ban is overly 
burdensome, and that New Jersey’s objectives could be 
accomplished in a less restrictive manner via a 
requirement that minor clients give their informed 
consent before undergoing SOCE counseling. We are not 
convinced, however, that an informed consent 
requirement would adequately serve New Jersey’s 
interests. Minors constitute an “especially vulnerable 
population,” see J.A. 405 (APA Report, Appendix A), 
and may feel pressured to receive SOCE counseling by 
their families and their communities despite their fear of 
being harmed, see J.A. 301 (APA Report) (explaining 
that “hostile social and family attitudes” are among the 
reasons minors seek SOCE counseling). Thus, even if 
SOCE counseling were helpful in a small minority of 
cases—and the legislature, based on the body of evidence 
before it, was entitled to reach a contrary conclusion—an 
informed consent requirement could not adequately 
ensure that only those minors that could benefit would 
agree to move forward. As Plaintiffs have offered no 
other suggestion as to how the New Jersey legislature 
could achieve its interests in a less restrictive manner, we 
conclude that A3371 is sufficiently tailored to survive 
intermediate scrutiny.  
Accordingly, we conclude that A3371 is a 




 Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that A3371 is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We disagree. 
 The Supreme Court has held that “standards of 
permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of 
free expression.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 
(1963) (citations omitted). “Because First Amendment 
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government 
may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.” 
Id. at 433 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, “perfect clarity 
and precise guidance have never been required even of 
regulations that restrict expressive activity.” Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) 
(citations omitted). “[B]ecause we are condemned to the 
use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty 
from our language.” Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 730, 733 
(2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Thus, “speculation about possible vagueness in 
hypothetical situations not before the Court will not 
support a facial attack on a statute when it is surely valid 
in the vast majority of its intended applications.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs argue that A3371 is unconstitutional on 
its face because the term “sexual orientation change 
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efforts” is impermissibly vague.23 We disagree. Under 
A3371, this term is defined as: 
[T]he practice of seeking to change a 
person’s sexual orientation, including, but 
not limited to, efforts to change behaviors, 
gender identity, or gender expressions, or to 
reduce or eliminate sexual or romantic 
attractions or feelings toward a person of the 
same gender; except that sexual orientation 
change efforts shall not include counseling 
for a person seeking to transition from one 
gender to another, or counseling that: 
(1) provides acceptance, support, and 
understanding of a person or 
facilitates a person’s coping, social 
support, and identity exploration and 
development, including orientation-
neutral interventions to prevent or 
address unlawful conduct or unsafe 
sexual practices; and 
 (2) does not seek to change sexual 
 orientation. 
                                                 
23  In the District Court, Plaintiffs also argued that the 
phrase “sexual orientation” is unconstitutionally vague. They 
do not pursue this argument on appeal.  
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N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:1-55. While this statutory definition 
may not provide “perfect clarity,” Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 
(quotation marks and citation omitted), its list of 
illustrative examples provides boundaries that are 
sufficiently clear to pass constitutional muster. Further, 
counseling designed to change a client’s sexual 
orientation is recognized as a discrete practice within the 
profession. Such counseling is sometimes referred to as 
“reparative” or “conversion” therapy and has been the 
specific target of public statements by recognized 
professional organizations. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:1-54 
(quoting statements from the American Psychiatric 
Association, the National Association of Social Workers, 
the American Counseling Association Governing 
Council, and the Pan American Health Organization 
referring to this practice). Plaintiffs themselves claim 
familiarity with this form of counseling and acknowledge 
that many counselors “specialize” in such practices. See, 
e.g., J.A. 168 (Decl. of Dr. Tara King) (explaining that 
Dr. King provides “sexual orientation change efforts 
(‘SOCE’) counseling”); J.A. 177 (Decl. of Dr. Ronald 
Newman) (explaining that “part of [Dr. Newman’s] 
practice involves what is often called sexual orientation 
change efforts (‘SOCE’) counseling”); J.A. 182 (Decl. of 
David Pruden, on behalf of NARTH) (explaining that 
“NARTH provides various presentations across the 
country hosted by mental health professionals who 
specialize in what is referred to in A3371 as sexual 
orientation change efforts (‘SOCE’) counseling”). To 
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those in the field of professional counseling, the meaning 
of this term is sufficiently definite “in the vast majority 
of its intended applications.” Hill, 530 U.S. at 733 
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, we reject 
Plaintiffs’ argument that A3371 is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
 As to overbreadth, a statute that impinges upon 
First Amendment freedoms is impermissibly overbroad if 
“a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional, judged in relation to [its] plainly 
legitimate sweep.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460, 473 (2010) (quoting Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 
n.6 (2008)). Plaintiffs’ only argument on this front is that 
A3371 prohibits SOCE counseling even when, in 
Plaintiffs’ view, such counseling would be especially 
beneficial. See Appellant’s Br. 47 (arguing that A3371 
prevents a minor from receiving SOCE counseling even 
if the cause of their same-sex attractions was sexual 
abuse). This argument, however, is nothing more than a 
disagreement with New Jersey’s empirical judgments 
regarding the effect of SOCE counseling on minors. As 
we have already concluded, New Jersey’s reasons for 
banning SOCE counseling were sufficiently supported by 
the legislative record. Thus, we hold that A3371 is not 





Plaintiffs’ second constitutional claim is that 
A3371 violates their First Amendment right to the free 
exercise of religion. For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that this claim also lacks merit.  
 
Under the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.” The right to freely exercise one’s religion, 
however, is not absolute. McTernan v. City of York, 577 
F.3d 521, 532 (3d Cir. 2009). If a law is “neutral” and 
“generally applicable,” it will withstand a free exercise 
challenge so long as it is “rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective.” Brown v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 284 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted). This is so even if the law “has the incidental 
effect of burdening a particular religious practice” or 
group. Id. at 284 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of  Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)).  
 
The issue before us, then, is whether A3371 is 
“neutral” and “generally applicable.” “A law is ‘neutral’ 
if it does not target religiously motivated conduct either 
on its face or as applied in practice.” Blackhawk v. 
Pennsylvania., 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533–40; Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 167 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
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“A law fails the general applicability requirement if it 
burdens a category of religiously motivated conduct but 
exempts or does not reach a substantial category of 
conduct that is not religiously motivated and that 
undermines the purposes of the law to at least the same 
degree as the covered conduct that is religiously 
motivated.” Id. at 209 (citations omitted).  
 
As a preliminary matter, A3371 makes no explicit 
reference to any religion or religious beliefs, and is 
therefore neutral on its face. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 
533–34. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that A3371 
covertly targets their religion by prohibiting counseling 
that is generally religious in nature while permitting other 
forms of counseling that are equally harmful to minors. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that A3371 operates as an 
impermissible “religious gerrymander”24 because it 
provides “individualized exemptions” for counseling: 
(1) for minors seeking to transition from one 
gender to another, (2) for minors struggling 
with or confused about heterosexual 
                                                 
24  A “religious gerrymander” occurs when the boundaries 
of statutory coverage are “artfully drawn” to target or exclude 
religiously-motivated activity. American Family Ass’n, Inc. v. 
F.C.C., 365 F.3d 1156, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also 
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535 (describing a “religious 
gerrymander” as “an impermissible attempt to target 
petitioners and their religious practices”). 
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attractions, behaviors, or identity, (3) that 
facilitates exploration and development of 
same-sex attractions, behaviors, or identity, 
(4) for individuals over the age of 18, and 
(5) provided by unlicensed counselors. 
  
Appellant’s Br. 51. 
 
 None of these five “exemptions,” however, 
demonstrate that A3371 covertly targets religiously 
motivated conduct. Plaintiffs’ first and third 
“exemptions” are not compelling because nothing in the 
record suggests that these forms of counseling are 
equally harmful to minors. Plaintiffs’ second 
“exemption,” which implies that A3371 would permit 
heterosexual-to-homosexual change efforts, misinterprets 
the statute; A3371 prohibits all “sexual orientation 
change efforts” regardless of the direction of the desired 
change. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:1-55 (defining “sexual 
orientation change efforts” as “including, but not limited 
to,” efforts to eliminate same sex attractions) (emphasis 
added). Lastly, Plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth “exemptions” 
are simply irrelevant because they have nothing to do 
with religion. Plaintiffs fail to explain how A3371’s 
focus on the professional status of the counselor or the 
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age of the client belies a concealed intention to suppress 
a particular religious belief.25  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that A3371 is neutral 
and generally applicable, and therefore triggers only 
rational basis review. In so doing, we reject Plaintiffs’ 
argument that even if A3371 were neutral and generally 
applicable, it should be subject to strict scrutiny under a 
“hybrid rights” theory. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend 
that because A3371 “burdens” both their free exercise 
and free speech rights, they have presented a “hybrid 
rights” claim that triggers heightened scrutiny. We have 
previously refused to endorse such a theory, McTernan v. 
                                                 
25  Plaintiffs also argue that A3371’s neutrality is 
undermined by a statement made by one of the members of 
the Task Force that authored the 2009 APA Report. 
According to Plaintiffs, this researcher claimed that the APA 
Task Force was unwilling to “take into account what are 
fundamentally negative religious perceptions of 
homosexuality—they don’t fit into our world view.” 
Appellant’s Br. 52. Plaintiffs fail to explain, however, how 
this statement reflects the New Jersey legislature’s motives in 
passing A3371. This statement was made by one of several 
members of the APA Task Force, which produced only one of 
the many pieces of evidence on which the legislature relied 
when passing A3371. It by no means establishes that New 
Jersey was secretly motivated by religious animus, as 
opposed to their stated objective of protecting minor citizens 
from harm.  
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City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 647 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009), 
and we refuse to do so today. See also Combs v. Homer-
Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“Until the Supreme Court provides direction, we believe 
the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta.”). Because we have 
already concluded that A3371 survives intermediate 
scrutiny, it follows ipso facto that this law is rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest. Therefore, we 
will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of this claim.  
 
V. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred by 
concluding that they lacked standing to bring claims on 
behalf of their minor clients.26 This argument is also 
without merit. 
 
“It is a well-established tenet of standing that ‘a 
litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and 
interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal 
rights or interests of third parties.’” Pennsylvania 
Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 
280 F.3d 278, 288 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Powers v. 
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). “Yet the prohibition is 
not invariable and our jurisprudence recognizes third-
party standing under certain circumstances.” Id. (citations 
                                                 
26  Although Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged claims on 
behalf of their patients’ parents, Plaintiffs do not pursue these 
claims on appeal.  
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omitted). To establish third-party standing, a litigant must 
demonstrate that (1) she has suffered an “injury in fact” 
that provides her with a “sufficiently concrete interest in 
the outcome of the issue in dispute”; (2) she has a “close 
relation to the third party”; and (3) there exists “some 
hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her 
own interests.” Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). In the present 
case, the parties agree that licensed counselors have a 
sufficiently “close relationship” to their clients, see 
Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 289–90, but 
dispute whether Plaintiffs have suffered a sufficient 
“injury in fact” and whether Plaintiffs’ clients are 
sufficiently “hindered” in their ability to bring suit 
themselves. We will address these two elements in turn. 
  
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred by 
holding that they did not suffer an “injury in fact.” We 
agree. The District Court reasoned that “Plaintiffs’ ability 
to bring third-party claims hinges on whether they 
suffered any constitutional wrongs by the passage of 
A3371.” J.A. 24. We have never held, however, that a 
plaintiff must possess a successful constitutional claim in 
order to establish an “injury in fact” sufficient to confer 
third-party standing. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
191–97 (1976), for example, the Supreme Court granted 
third-party standing to a vendor who did not even allege 
a violation of her own constitutional rights—she merely 
alleged that the law at issue, in violating the rights of her 
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customers, resulted in a reduction in her sales. Here, 
Plaintiffs are similarly injured by A3371 in that they are 
forced to either sacrifice a portion of their client base or 
disobey the law and risk the loss of their licenses. Thus, 
we conclude that Plaintiffs have a “sufficiently concrete 
interest” in this dispute regardless of whether A3371 
violates their constitutional rights.  
 
We agree with Defendants, however, that Plaintiffs 
have failed to establish that their clients are “hindered” in 
their ability to bring suit themselves. The only evidence 
Plaintiffs provide on this issue is Dr. Newman’s assertion 
that “[n]either of [his] clients wants others to even know 
they are in therapy.”27 J.A. 448 (Decl. of Ronald 
Newman, Ph.D.). While a fear of social stigma can in 
some circumstances constitute a substantial obstacle to 
filing suit, see Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d 
at 290, Plaintiffs’ evidence does not sufficiently establish 
the presence of such fear here. Further, we note that 
minor clients have been able to file suit pseudonymously 
in both Pickup and Doe v. Christie, 2014 WL 3765310 
(D.N.J. July 31, 2014). While we disagree with the 
District Court that the presence of such lawsuits is 
                                                 
27  Further, Dr. Newman made this assertion as a 
justification for not asking his patients to testify in open court, 
not as a reason these patients would be unwilling to file suit 




dispositive,28 the fact that minor clients have previously 
filed suit bolsters our conclusion that they are not 
sufficiently hindered in their ability to protect their own 
interests. Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiffs lack 




 Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred by 
allowing Garden State to intervene. They advance two 
arguments on this point: first, that the District Court 
erroneously concluded that Garden State was not 
required to possess Article III standing; and second, that 
the District Court abused its discretion by permitting 
Garden State to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(b). For the reasons that follow, we reject 
both arguments. 
 
                                                 
28  The District Court reasoned that “since these litigants 
are bringing their own action against Defendants, there can be 
no serious argument that these third parties are facing 
obstacles that would prevent them from pursuing their own 
claims.” J.A. 22. As we have explained, however, “a party 
need not face insurmountable hurdles to warrant third-party 
standing.” Pennsylvania Psychiatric Soc’y, 280 F.3d at 290 
(citation omitted). Thus, the fact that a few patients have been 
able to overcome certain obstacles does not necessarily 
preclude a determination that these obstacles are a 





 “Article III of the Constitution limits the power of 
federal courts to deciding ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ 
This requirement ensures the presence of the ‘concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues 
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination 
of difficult constitutional questions.’” Diamond v. 
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61–62 (1986) (citing Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). In order to ensure that 
such a “case” or “controversy” is present, the Supreme 
Court has consistently required prospective plaintiffs to 
establish Article III standing in order to pursue a lawsuit 
in federal court. See, e.g., id. at 62. Prospective plaintiffs 
must therefore allege a “personal injury fairly traceable 
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely 
to be redressed by the requested relief.” Already, LLC v. 
Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  
 
 Whether prospective intervenors must establish 
Article III standing, however, is an open question in the 
Third Circuit. See American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 
658 F.3d 311, 318 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e need not 
today resolve the issue of whether a party seeking to 
intervene must have Article III standing.”). As the 
District Court acknowledged, our sister circuits are 
divided on this question. The majority have held that an 
intervenor is not required to possess Article III standing 
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to participate. See San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 503 
F.3d 1163, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Ruiz v. 
Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830–33 (5th Cir. 1998); Associated 
Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th 
Cir. 1994); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th 
Cir. 1991); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 
(11th Cir. 1989); and United States Postal Serv. v. 
Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978). The Eighth 
and D.C. Circuits have reached a contrary conclusion. 
See Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 
1996); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. 
Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984).29 
 
                                                 
29  The District Court cited United States v. 36.96 Acres of 
Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985), as falling on this side of 
the split as well. While 36.96 Acres held that a party seeking 
intervention as of right must demonstrate an interest that is 
“greater than the interest sufficient to satisfy the standing 
requirement,” id. at 859, it is unclear whether the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that this greater interest was required by 
Article III of the Constitution or merely by the then-existing 
version of Rule 24(a). See Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 831 (explaining 
that “of the cases cited in Diamond”—including 36.96 
Acres—“only Kelly maintains that Article III (and not just 
Rule 24(a)(2) & 24(b)(2)) requires intervenors to possess 
standing.”). To the extent 36.96 held that a greater interest 
was constitutionally required, it provided no reasoning for 
that conclusion and thus carries no persuasive weight. 
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 We find the majority’s view more persuasive. If 
the plaintiff that initiated the lawsuit in question has 
Article III standing, a “case” or “controversy” exists 
regardless of whether a subsequent intervenor has such 
standing. See Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 832 (“Once a valid 
Article III case-or-controversy is present, the court’s 
jurisdiction vests. The presence of additional parties, 
although they alone could independently not satisfy 
Article III’s requirements, does not of itself destroy 
jurisdiction already established.”); Chiles, 865 F.2d at 
1212 (“Intervention under Rule 24 presumes that there is 
a justiciable case into which an individual wants to 
intervene.”).  
 
Further, while the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly concluded that intervenors need not possess 
Article III standing, this conclusion is implicit in several 
decisions in which it has questioned whether a particular 
intervenor has Article III standing but nonetheless 
refrained from resolving the issue. See, e.g., McConnell 
v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) 
(“It is clear, however, that the [named defendant] has 
standing, and therefore we need not address the standing 
of the intervenor-defendants . . . .”), overruled on other 
grounds by Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010); Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997) (expressing “grave 
doubts” about whether intervenors possessed Article III 
standing but concluding that it “need not definitively 
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resolve the issue”). As the Tenth Circuit reasoned in San 
Juan Cnty., the Supreme Court could not have avoided 
these questions if intervenors were required to have 
standing under Article III “because the Court could not 
simply ignore whether the requirements of Article III had 
been satisfied.” 503 F.3d at 1172. See also id. (“Standing 
implicates a court’s jurisdiction, and requires a court 
itself to raise and address standing before reaching the 
merits of the case before it.”) (quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 
did not err by determining that Garden State need not 




 Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court abused 
its discretion by permitting Garden State to intervene 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b). This 
argument lacks merit as well. 
 
 Rule 24(b) provides that “[o]n timely motion, the 
court may permit anyone to intervene who: (A) is given a 
conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or (B) 
has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a 
common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(b)(1). In exercising its discretion, a district court 
“must consider whether the intervention will unduly 
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delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ 
rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). We have previously 
noted that a district court’s ruling on a motion for 
permissive intervention is a “highly discretionary 
decision” into which we are “reluctant to intrude.” Brody 
By and Through Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 
(3d Cir. 1992). 
 
 We see no reason to disturb the District Court’s 
decision in this case. Garden State’s motion was timely, 
as it was filed a mere 14 days after the complaint. Garden 
State and New Jersey also share the common legal 
position that A3371 does not violate Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights. Lastly, Plaintiffs’ argument that they 
are unduly prejudiced by having to respond to 
“superfluous arguments” is not convincing. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 




Although we reject the District Court’s conclusion 
that A3371 prohibits only “conduct” that is wholly 
unprotected by the First Amendment, we uphold the 
statute as a regulation of professional speech that passes 
intermediate scrutiny. We agree with the District Court 
that A3371 does not violate Plaintiffs’ right to free 
exercise of religion, as it is a neutral and generally 
applicable law that is rationally related to a legitimate 
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government interest. We further agree that Plaintiffs lack 
standing to bring claims on behalf of their minor clients, 
and conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by permitting Garden State to intervene. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  
